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The Declaratory Judgment as an
Alternative Remedy in Ohio
LAUREN A. GLOSSER*
In 1933 Ohio enacted a Uniform Declaratory Judgments
Act which superseded Sections 1o5o5-i to 10505-10 of the
General Code which had empowered only the probate courts
to render declaratory decrees.
The Uniform Act is as follows:
G.C. 1212 o-i. Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions
shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action or pro-
ceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a declaratory judg-
ment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either affirmative
or negative in form or effect; and such declarations shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree.
G.C. 12102-2. Any person interested under a deed, will, written
contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status,
or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance,
contract or franchise, may have determined any question of construction
or validity arising under the instrument, statute or ordinance, contract or
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations
thereunder.
G.C. 12 102-3. A contract may be construed either before or after a
breach thereof.
G.C. 12102-4. (Enumerates persons who may bring action.)
* Former student, Ohio State University, College of Law.
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G.C. 12102-5. (States that the powers of G.C. 12102-I are not
limited to the enumeration of 1210272, 12102-3, or 12102-4.)
G.C. 12102-6. The court may refuse to render or enter a declara-
tory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered
or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving
rise to the proceeding.
G.C. 12102-7. (Provides for review of decrees.)
G.C. I2102-8. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or
decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application
therefore shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the
relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall on reason-
able notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated
by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief
should not be granted forthwith.
G.C. 12102-9. When a proceeding under this act involves the de-
termination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined in
the same manner as issues of fact are tried and determined in other civil
actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending.
G.C. 12102-10. (Relates to costs.)
G.C. 12102-I1. (Defines the necessary parties.)
G.C. 12102-12. The act is declared to be remedial; tits purpose is
to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect
to rights, status, and other legal relations; and is to be liberally construed
and administered.
G.C. 12102-13. (Defines "persons" for purposes of the act.)
G.C. 12102-14- (Declares severability of sections.)
G.C. 12 102-15. This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to
effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states
which enact it, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws
and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees.
The purpose of the act is a twofold one. First, it seeks to
afford a remedy in those controversies where a cause of action
has not yet accrued so as to entitle the party or parties to one of
the traditional remedies. It seeks to give relief in anticipation
of a breach. It purports to afford a solution to controversies
which exist presently but which must wait a passage of time or
some action by one of the parties before adjudication is possible.
It gives a party, whose rights are subject to dispute or threat, a
present protection or definition of those rights in circumstances
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where he would have to await an indefinite passage of time, or
at the will of the other party, until an adjudication under the
usual remedies would be available. Secondly, it seeks to give to
parties, who might have resorted to the existing form of relief,
a more expeditious and less violent form of action by way of
declaration. By a simple, pacific declaration of rights it would
afford an effective remedy in instances where only the violent
force of ejectment or mandamus or other remedy was hereto-
fore available. Professor Borchard, a recognized authority on
declaratory judgments, says' "(The act) enables actions to be
brought on two types of operative facts, (a) those which might
also have justified an action for an executory judgment or de-
cree, or (b) those which are not susceptible of any other relief."
This new procedural device has vast potentialities as a
simple, efficacious remedy, and its introduction to our jurispru-
dence has been awaited with interest. It is particularly unfortu-
nate, therefore, that it should receive a construction greatly
limiting its scope at the very outset.
A recent court of appeals decision (motion to certify over-
ruled by the supreme court), removes one of the salutary pur-
poses of the act by holding that declarations are not available
in those cases where the operative facts would justify an execu-
tory action.
In Eiffel Realty Co. v. Ohio Citizens Trust Co.' the court
declared, contrary to the general practice of states having the
same statute, that:
The proceeding for a declaratory judgment is not a substitute or
alternative for the common law or statutory actions existing when the
Declaratory Judgments Act was adopted in Ohio.
In that case it was held that:
A lessor, claiming the right to forfeit the lease and repossess the leased
premises by reason of defaults of the lessee in payment of rent and taxes
as required by the lease, has an adequate remedy in ejectment, and an
action for a declaratory judgment to accomplish such purpose cannot be
maintained.
'Borchard's Declaratory Judgments, p 24 (1934).
2 55 Ohio App. 1, 8 N.E. (2nd) 470 (1937).
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Although the court of appeals intimated that the common
pleas court refused to take jurisdiction solely on the ground
that a remedy at law was available the opinion of the lower
court does not restrict its holding to that single cause. The
lower court enumerated four distinct points: (i) that there was
a remedy at law; (2) that there would be a jury question not
justiciable in a declaratory judgment action; (3) that there was
a question whether forfeiture could be declared, there being
some evidence of a waiver of the right of forfeiture; (4) that
a pending action on the same issue would bar a declaratory
judgment. After a discussion of these four points the court
stated that under all these circumstances the order of the court
should merely be a refusal to render a declaration on the sub-
ject. A reading of the opinion of the judge of the common
pleas court leaves a real doubt as to the correctness of the court
of appeals' decision that the holding of the former was based
simply on the adequacy of the legal remedy.
The decision of the common pleas court with respect to the
trial of facts and the pending of another action in the same
controversy merits further consideration. In regard to the
former the court said, "The question is, has he (the defendant)
waived his right to trial by jury on the question of whether or
not he is indebted to the plaintiff (for rents). I have studied
the work of Professor Borchard on the subject of declaratory
judgments with considerable diligence, but I have searched the
pages of that book in vain for an authoritative declaration that
the declaratory judgment may be used as a substitute for trial
of the controversy in which parties have a constitutional right
to a trial by jury." The act, rather than attempting a substitute
for jury trials makes specific provision for it. G.C. i2io2-9
reads, "When a proceeding under this act involves the determi-
nation of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and determined
in the same manner as issues of fact are tried an determined
in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is
pending." This provision was included so that the existence of
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 5
such issues would not defeat or bar, on constitutional grounds,
an action for declaratory relief. Professor Borchard in his work
on Declaratory Judgments on pages 120-121 states that,
"There was no necessity for mention of jury trial in the Uni-
form Act except to give an assurance that the matter had not
been overlooked and that the usual rules adopted by the state
for the classification of civil issues and their trial were not in-
tended to be interfered with.... The provisions for a jury trial
are a safeguard against the definitive dismissal of the case when
issues of fact arise the jury trial of which may be and is properly
claimed, and an assurance of possible doubters that constitutional
guaranties have not been overlooked."
The common pleas judge further ruled "that it is settled
that a declaratory judgment proceeding will not be allowed if
a suit is pending in another court on the same issue." The judge
declared that a "court will refuse a declaration where another
court has jurisdiction of the issue."'  However it appears in a
supplementary brief on this case that the other suit was dis-
missed and that the suit for declaratory judgment was based on
a breach by the lessee, failure to pay rents, occurring after the
dismissal of the other action. Certainly the principles relied
upon was not involved as the issue was not the same nor was it
pending at the time of the suit.
Does the Declaratory Judgment Act provide an alternative
remedy? May the plaintiff choose between two remedies?
Must he resort to the forceful procedure of existing forms of
action or can he elect to have a simple declaration of his rights?
Must he attempt to eject the defendant or does the Act permit
him to have a definition of the rights of the respective parties
so that they may peaceably settle the controversy without the
use of legal force? This was the issue before the court of ap-
peals. The Act was before the court for construction on this
vital issue for the first time -Shall the Act be given a con-
' Pages 37-38 appellant's brief on motion to certify case No. 26433 Su-
preme Court of the State of Ohio.
6 LAW JOURNAL -DECEMBER, 1937
struction which will allow it a broad scope or is it to be limited
to those cases in which no adequate remedy exists in law and
equity? The court of appeals of Lucas County gave the Act
a narrow construction.
In reaching this decision the court relied upon cases from
New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Hampshire, Michigan,
and Florida as authority for the proposition that a declaratory
judgment is not available when there is an adequate existing
remedy. The restriction imposed by this decision, the question
being one of first impression in our courts, and the importance
of this remedial reform are circumstances warranting a review
of these authorities.
It is submitted that not only are there statutory differences
distinguishing the New York Act and the Ohio Act but that
the New York courts have specifically refused to deny a declara-
tion simply because another remedy is available.
The New York Act after reciting the power of the supreme
court to make declarations of rights, continues- "Such pro-
visions shall be made by rules as may be necessary and proper
to carry into effect the provisions of this section."' Pursuant to
this clause Rule 212 was adopted and by its terms the courts
are given a discretion in rendering declarations where other
remedies are available.
If in the opinion of the court, the parties should be left to relief by
existing forms of action, or for other reasons, it may decline to pronounce
a declaratory judgment stating the grounds on which its discretion is so
exercised.5
Even by virtue of this rule, which does not appear in our
law, the New York courts do not hold that the declaratory
judgment is but a supplementary procedure and that it cannot
be invoked whenever another remedy exists. The court is vested
with discretion to refuse jurisdiction but it is not bound to do so.'
4 Sec. 473 New York Civil Practice Act.
O Rules of Civil Practice of New York (193 i).
6 Wollard v. Schaffer Stores Co. 272 N.Y. 304 5 N.E. (ad) 829 (1936).
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The above cited case is worthy of especial attention since it
is almost identical in its facts and circumstances to the Ohio case.
The court, although invested with discretion, refused to deny
a declaratory judgment on the ground that an adequate remedy
existed at law. There, as in the Ohio case, the plaintiff, lessor,
sought a declaration of forfeiture of a lease and damages for
rent, and the defendent, lessee, claimed a waiver of the right
to forfeiture. It was there urged that ejectment would lie and
constituted an adequate legal remedy so as to bar a declaratory
judgment. This was the basis of the argument of the Ohio
court. The New York Court of Appeals gave this answer to
that question:
Pursuant to section 473 of the Civil Practice Act and Rule 212 Of
the Rules of Civil Practice, the Supreme Court is vested with power to
declare rights and other legal relations on request for such declaration,
"whether or not further relief is or could be claimed," and it also has
discretion (under Rule 212) to decline to pronounce a declaratory judg-
ment if, in its opinion, the parties should be left to relief by existing forms
of action. "We may not limit by judicial construction a power which the
Legislature has conferred without limitation. We may not define the
bounds within which that power may be exercised, except as we find such
bounds implicit in the statute, read in the light of established public
policy." Westchester Mortgage Co. v. Grand Rapids and I. R. Co. 246
N. Y. 194, 158 N.E. 70. While resort to the use of a declaratory judg-
ment is usually unnecessary where an adequate remedy is already pro-
vided by another form of action "no limitation has been placed or
attempted to be placed on its use." So we held in James v. Alderton
Dock Yards 256 N.Y. 298, 176 N.E. 4oi,1 but that judgment was
necessarily reversed on its merits, for the reason that the plaintiff in no
event was entitled to an equitable lien .... We have never gone so far
as to hold that, when there exists a genuine controversy requiring a
judicial determination, the Supreme Court is bound, solely for the reason
that another remedy is available, to refuse to exercise the power conferred
by section 473 and rule 2 12.8
The court thus proceeded to declare that plaintiff had waived
his right of forfeiture but was entitled to damages for rent.
7 This case is cited by the Ohio court as authority for its decision.
8 TVollard v. Schaffer Stores n. 6 supra.
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The New York practice is summarized in a digest of the
law of that state as follows: "In New York State the court may
exercise the power conferred upon it to make declarations, not-
withstanding the fact that the situation presented admits of a
conventional judgment."9
Prior to 1935 the Pennsylvania courts denied jurisdiction
under a declaratory judgments act identical to the Ohio act
when "any other established remedy was available.""oa It was
likewise denied when there was a "statutory""9 b or an "equit-
able" " remedy available.
However in 1935 the Pennsylvania statute was so amended
as to deny the use of the declaratory action as an alternative to
other remedies, thus giving statutory authority for the position
taken by the courts. Section 6 of the Pennsylvania act now
reads:
Where, however, a statute provides a special form of remedy for a
specific type of case that statutory remedy must be followed; but the
mere fact that an actual or threatened controversy is susceptible of relief
through a general common law remedy, or an equitable remedy, or an
extraordinary legal remedy, whether such remedy is recognized or regu-
lated by statute or not, shall not debar a party from the privilege of
obtaining a declaratory judgment or decree in any case where the other
essentials to such relief are present, but the case is not ripe for relief by
way of such common law remedy, or extraordinary legal remedy."0
Specifically the statute prohibits the use of the declaratory
action where a special statutory remedy is available, and by
inference it prohibits such action when the controversy is "ripe"
for relief by common law remedies. Since this enactment the
Pennsylvania court has recognized both the specific"'a and the
inferential..b prohibition of the statute.
9 Carmody's "Treatise on Pleading and Practice in New York," Vol. 5,
p. 4350. Baumann v. Baumann 2z6 N. Y. S. 576 is cited in regard to the
above statement.9aInre CrynsEstate 15z Atl. 675, 301 Pa. 386 (193o).
Ob Petition of Kahriher No. x, z84 Pa. 455, 131 At. 265 (923).
'0 Appeal of Kimmell 96 Pa. Super. Ct. 488 (1929).
'0 1935 Pa. Laws, pp. 72, 73.
i°a City of Erie v. Phillips, 187 At. 203, 323 Pa. 557 (1936).
lob Allegheny County v. Equitable Gas Co., 183 At. 916, 32 Pa. 127
(I936).
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The court of appeals relied upon Sheldon v. Powell 99 Fla.
782, 128 So. 258 (1930), as authority for the rule that "where
there is another plain, adequate remedy available the statute
cannot be invoked." The court was evidently under a miscon-
ception as to the holding in this case because the Florida court
granted a declaration of rights of legatees under a will despite
the admitted fact that another remedy was available by statute."
The issue was raised that the existence of the statutory remedy
would exclude recourse to the declaratory action. The appellant
contended that, "If appellees were entitled to any relief what-
ever they should have proceeded under section 3735 which is
exclusive as to such matters as this ...." The court specifically
denied this contention. . . . "'We think that appellees might
have proceeded under section 3735, Revised General Statutes
of i92o, to have the legacy brought in question released to
them, but we do not think that remedy exclusive. Chapter
7857, Acts of 19i9, authorizing declaratory decrees, neither
repeals, nor is it incompatible with section 3735. As to the
question involved here it is merely cumulative, so the appellees
had their option to pursue either remedy."
This decision permitted the declaratory action to be used
alternatively to a statutory remedy and lends no authority to
the rule for which it was cited by the Ohio court.
Brindley v. Meara, 198 N.E. 301 (Ind.), ioi A.L.R. 682
(935), is also cited as authority for the proposition that decla-
ratory relief is not an alternative remedy. The actual conten-
tion in the case was not whether declaratory relief could be
given when another remedy is available but whether the section
providing for additional relief (similar to Ohio statute) au-
thorizes executory relief in connection with declaratory judg-
ments or whether a separate action must be brought for execu-
tory relief. Prior to the instant case a declaration had already
been granted as to the rights of an advisory board to appoint
relief officials rather than the trustee, 2 and the action in the
"' Sec. 3735 Rev. Gen. Stat. Fla. of i92o.
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present case was to enjoin the trustee from exercising such
power and the court was construing only that section that had
to do with additional relief. The court held that the act does
not authorize further executory relief since the tide limits the
act to the declaration of rights, etc., and since the Indiana con-
stitution provides that no act shall be broader than the title its
application is limited to declarations only. It is possible that
another remedy in the nature of quo warranto might have been
available in the first action. This destroys the authority of the
case in Ohio. Its authority is further weakened when the court
seemed to approve the opposite position. It said, "and there
may be cases in which, notwithstanding executory or coercive
relief could be claimed, it is made to appear that a declaratory
judgment or decree will terminate the controversy between the
parties without coercive relief. Such a case would seem to be
within the purposes of the act.. ." and, "the courts had already
interpreted the statutes as authorizing declaratory relief when
other relief could be claimed. .. ."
It may be noted in passing that most states, having the
section providing for further relief in addition to the declara-
tion, have construed such as authorizing further coercive or
executory action." The apparent reason for this character of
additional relief is given in Nat'l City Bank v. Wagner 2.43
N. Y. S. 299 (1930), which after calling attention to the Eng-
lish practice of combining prayers for declaratory and coercive
relief, states "that a declaratory action ought, in equity, to give
real relief, so that a second independent suit need not be re-
quired to be brought, when all matters can be litigated in one
action." In fact no authority could be found in accord with the
Indiana holding which appears to be attributable to the con-
stitutional restriction limiting acts to the extent of their tides.
'
2 Meara v. Brindley 207 Ind. 657, 194 N.E. 351 (1935).
'3 Joy Co. v. New Amsterdam Co. 98 Conn. 794, 12o Ad. 684 (1923);
Brix v. Peoples Mut. Life Ins. Co. z Cal. (2d) 446; 41 Pac. (Znd) 537
(935); Beatty v. Chi. B. & Q. R. R. 52 Pac. (2d) 404, 49 WyO. 22
(0935); Morris v. Ellis 221 Wis. 307, 266 N.W. 923 Wis. (1936);
Mitchell v. Williambridge Mills 14 Fed. Supp. 954 (1936).
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Of the authorities relied upon by the court then, only Michi-
gan and New Hampshire support the proposition that the
declaratory judgment is not an alternative remedy in absence
of specific statutory expression to that effect.
Authorities upholding the alternative character of the reme-
dy are cited in both the majority and minority opinions.14 To
this list might be added Hays v. Hays 26o KY. 586, 86 S.W.
(2d) 313 (935), a federal case"5 to be discussed later, and a
statement from the Kansas court" that "relief under the decla-
ratory judgments act should be refused because of availability
of another remedy only where the court believes that more
effective relief can and should be obtained by another procedure
and that for that reason a declaration will not serve a useful
purpose."
The majority of the Ohio court stated that the Connecticut,
Virginia, and North Carolina cases, above cited, were to be
explained on the grounds that the tenant was seeking a declara-
tion as to his rights to continue as a tenant under a lease rather
than the lessor seeking a termination of it. This distinction does
not at all maintain the proposition that the remedy does not
lie when there is another available remedy. Sigal v. Wise
(Conn.) is a declaration as to a tenant's rights if a burned
building is reconstructed and it does not appear whether another
remedy was available or not. In Cohen v. Rosen (Va.) the court
stated that the dispute might have been settled by other statu-
tory methods but that the bill could be maintained for a decla-
ratory judgment. The Power Co. v. Iseley case (N. C.)"7
involved the declaration of rights of a street car company under
14 Wollenberg v. Tonningsen 8 Cal App. (2d) 7z2, 48 Pac. (zd) 738
(1935); Tuscaloosa County v. Shamblin 233 Ala. 6, 169 So. 234 (1936);
Sigalv. WVise 1i4 Conn. 298, 158 Ad. 891; Carolina Light and Power Co. v.
Iseley, 203 N.C. 811, 167 S.E. 56; Nashville C. and St. L. R. R. Co. v. Wal-
lace 288 U.S. 249, 77 L. Ed. 730, 53 Sup.Ct. 345; Cohenv. Rosen 157 Va.
71, 16o S.E. 36 (I93I).
a Penn. .v. Glenn io Fed. Supp. 483 (1935).
16 Hudson v. Tray. Ins. Co. 67 Pac. (d) 593, May 1937.
17 See n. 14 supra.
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a franchise and the question of other available remedies was not
raised but in Allison v. Sharp, 2o9 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 2,7
(936), the court allowed a bill for the declaration involving
the constitutionality of a staute although there was another
remedy at law available to serve this purpose, saying, "While
there was another remedy at law available to them, they have
challenged the constitutionality of the statute under which they
contend the registrar refused them registration. Under such
circumstances and conditions the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ment Act affords a ready means of testing its validity, as
pointed out in Borchard's Declaratory Jbtdgments, p. 549."
In the federal courts the view is expressed that the federal
declaratory judgment procedure is an alternative remedy not
to be precluded by the existence of another form of action.18
There an action was brought against the federal tax collector to
have the Tobacco Control Act and its consequent tax declared
unconstitutional. In granting the declaration the court made
the following statement regarding the argument that the plain-
tiff could have availed himself of the usual remedy, i.e., pay
the tax and sue to recover the same.
In support of the contention that the Federal Declaratory Judgment
Act was not intended by Congress to be available in cases arising under
the revenue laws of the United States, counsel for the defendant argue
that an action for a declaratory judgment is not maintainable where
18 Penn. v. Glenn io Fed. Supp. 483 (appeal dismissed) 84 Fed. (2d)
1001 (1936). In Stephenson, v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of United
States (i937) Fed. (2d), 5 U. S. Law Week 10-19-37, p. 13, holding the
Federal Act provides an alternative remedy, Parker, C. J., said: "The funda-
mental error of the court below consists in assuming that a proceeding for a
declaratory judgment may not be maintained where another remedy is avail-
able. There is nothing in the act which limits its application to suits in equity
or which suggests that the availability of other remedies shall preclude its use.
On the contrary, the provision in the first paragraph for pleading by 'declara-
tion,' as well as by complaint or petition and the provision in the third para-
graph for jury trial show clearly that declaratory judgments in legal as well
as equitable proceedings were contemplated; and that the remedy provided
was intended as an alternative one in cases where other remedies are available
is shown by the provision of the first paragraph that such judgments tnay be
rendered 'whether or not further relief is or could be prayed'."
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there is available another adequate remedy. While some state courts
have so construed their state declaratory judgment acts, such is not the
general rule, and, in my judgment, unless the act is so restricted by its
terms, such a construction is not justified. There is neither expressed
nor implied in the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act any such restric-
tion upon its use, and this court is not warranted in writing into it any
such restriction.
The Ohio Act is so similar in terms to the Federal Act as to
admit of no authority for imposing the "judicial restriction"
that the federal court refused to apply.
In Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 Fed. (2d) 145
(936), although the court grants a declaratory judgment in a
case of threatened tax assessment where the issues were not yet
drawn so as to warrant coercive relief, the court cites Penn. v.
Glenn as authority for the following statement:
For while it may not be doubted that the Federal Declaratory Judg-
ment Act is a purely remedial statute, and does not purport to, nor does
it add to the content of the jurisdiction of national courts, it certainly
does purport in cases where federal jurisdiction is present, to effect, and
we think it does, effect thorough-going remedial changes, by adding to
the coercive or warlike remedies in those courts by way of prevention and
reparation, the more pacific and prophylactic one of a declaration of
rights. When, then, an actual controversy exists, of which, if coercive
relief could be granted in it the federal courts would have jurisdiction,
they may take jurisdiction under this statute, of the controversy to grant
relief of declaration either before or after the stage of relief by coercion
has been reached.
In Western Casaalty and Surety Co. v. Beverforden; 17
Fed. Supp. 928 (1936), the District Court refused a declara-
tory judgment in which it was stated that "a declaratory judg-
ment is intended to be supplemental" and "It is to be used
when adequate relief is not presently available." But that suit
was by an insurer and was instituted after a judgment was pro-
cured against the insured and just as a suit was about to be filed
against the insurer so that the declaratory action would have
only delayed a legal cause of action involving the same issue.
The court said, "A loss has occurred. A suit is about to be filed.
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The respondent has recovered judgment against the operator
of one of the cars." It then quoted I Corpus Juris Secundum,
Actions Sec. 18, p. 1O28, in what seems to be the controlling
reason for the holding: "Moreover the statute is not intended
to delay a party in the prosecution of an accrued cause of action
until the termination of the proceeding for a declaratory judg-
ment."
Federal declarations have also been refused where statutes
have by express terms forbidden resort to the declaratory judg-
ments act as a means of testing their constitutionality. Union
Packing Co. v. Rogan, 17 Fed. Supp. 934 (I937), and Beeland
Wholesale Co. v. Davis, 88 Fed. (2d) 447 (Social Security
Act) (1937).
Penn. v. Glenn has not been overruled nor distinguished and
stands as the definite expression of the federal courts.
In England up to 1883 declaratory judgments could be
granted only when other relief could also be awarded. In the
Rules of Court of 1883 (Order XXV, Rule 5) it was provided
that such relief could be granted whether executory relief was
or could have been claimed, or not. This provision defining the
alternative character of the remedy has been the historical prac-
tice of English courts.
The Ohio court cites an English case as an authority for its
decision saying, "While the declaratory judgment has been
sanctioned in England since 1852, it is sparingly used there, 9
and a wide discretion in its application is recognized." (Cites
Barradough v. Brown L. R. (1897) A.C., 615, 623; 66 L. J.,
Q.B., N.S., 672). Although the English statute allows discre-
tion to refuse a declaration" "in any case where (it) . . . is not
necessary or proper," it is recognized in England as an alterna-
tive, optional remedy. The committee on Uniform Declaratory
'19 As to the "sparing use" of the action in England the Uniform Commit-
tees reported that, "Of the official reports of cases in the chancery division in
1884, 34 per cent were declaratory actions; in 1916, based upon the cases re-
ported in second chancery division this percentage had risen to 67 per cent."
(Handbook of the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 192o, p.
179.)
20 Section 4, English Declaratory Judgments Act.
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Judgments Act which drafted the Uniform Law, stated, in its
annotations defining the practice under the English act, that it
"empowers the court to make a declaration where no other
relief is asked for or where on the facts no substantial relief
could be given."" Paraphrasing this statement it appears that,
according to this committee, declarations could be given when
other forms of relief could be had but are not requested and
when no other relief could be requested. In the same citation
this committee further emphasizes the alternative character of
the procedure under the English practice, saying, "Frequently
a declaration is asked for instead of an injunction, to settle dif-
ferences over the existence of a right of way, or trespass. In
Harrison v. Duke of Rutland (1893) I Q.B. 142 C.A., Kay
L. J., said, 'It is not unusual in the Chancery Division to make
such a declaration without going on to grant an injunction'. In
Ankerson v. Connelly (19o6) 2 Ch. 544, a declaration was
made that an easement of ancient light had been extinguished.
In Gingell v. Stepney (i9o6) 2 K.B. 468, certain hay sellers
obtained a declaration, without asking for damages, that they
were entitled to stand their carts in the old hay market. .... "
Authorities who have examined into the English practice
of the declaratory judgment are agreed as to its use as an
alternative remedy there. It has been said that, in England, a
survey of "recent decisions indicates that the normal use of the
action for a declaration is in cases where 'consequential relief
is or can be claimed'. . . . These cases, the common cases, of
declaratory judgments, are cases in which some other remedy
is or could be claimed. It is convenient for the plaintiff to say
to the defendant: 'This is the law.' It is bad policy both in
administration and business, to threaten a person with whom
one is in dispute."22
21 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws p. 28I.2 2 Declaratory Judgments against Public Authorities in England, by
Jennings, 41 Yale Law Journal 407, 45. See also A Modern Evolution in
Remedial Rights-The Declaratory Judgment, by Sunderland, 16 Mich. Law
Review 69, 75, 76. See Borchard on The Declaratory Judgment as an Alterna-
tive Remedy, 36 Yale Law Journal 403, 405.
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As stated by Professor Borchard, in a great majority of cases
in which declaratory judgments were issued it would have been
perfectly possible to obtain another form of relief. 3
The Ohio act differs from that of New York which, under
the court rules authorized by the act, gives courts discretion to
refuse a declaration when another remedy is available, and
from that of Pennsylvania which bars the action when another
remedy exists. The Ohio law contains no provision that vests
the courts with discretion as to the granting of a declaration
when another remedy is available. Contrarily the act contains
certain provisions that indicate an intent that the remedy should
be an alternative one. Section i2io2-I provides for declaratory
judgments "whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed," and "no action shall be open to the objection . . . on
the ground that a declaratory judgment or decree is prayed
for." The court is vested with authority to refuse a decree only
in one section (io12-6) where "such judgment . . .would
not terminate the uncertainty or controversy. . . . 112102-3
permits a construction of a contract either "before or after there
has been a brea-ch thereof." Of what purpose is this section as
to construction after a breach which would give rise to another
23 Borchard's Declaratory Judgments pp. 15 1-153. In Blakeslee v. Wil-
son 19o Cal. 479, z13 Pac. 495 (1923) a declaration for right to money
was granted when plaintiff could have sued for damages. In Sloan v. Longcope
288 Pa. 196, 135 At. 717 (1927) a declaration of a landlord's right to pos-
session (similar to the Ohio case) was given where plaintiff could have sued for
the property, for the right of possession, or ej ectment. In Earl Russell v. Mid-
hurst Rural District Council 98 L.T.R. 530 (Ch. i9O8) a declaration against
defendants right to trespass was made where plaintiff could have sued for
mandamus or injunction, or for damages generally. In Sheldon v. Powell 99
Fla. 782, Iz8 So. 258; Allison v. Sharp 209 N.C. 477, 184 S.E. 27; Penn.
v. Glenn io Fed Supp. 483; Wollard v. Schaffer Stores 272 N.Y. 304, 5 N.E.
(2d) 829;Tuscaloosa County v. Shamblitt 233 Ala. 6, 169 So. 234, discussed
ante, declarations were granted though other remedies were stated to be avail-
able. The Colorado court in Equit. Life v. Hemenover 100 Col. 23 1, 67 Pac.
(2d) 8o (1937) gave a declaration as to rights of beneficiaries to double lia-
bility under an insurance contract where they could have sued for the amount
in money. Nebraska in State v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. 272 N.W. 555
(1937) granted the state a declaration as to the liability of the insurance com-
pany to a tax when the state could have sued for the taxes.
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form of action, if the availability of another form of action
would bar a declaratory judgment? If the legislature intended
that a contract could be construed after a breach by declaration
it must have meant that the remedy is an alternative to a suit
for damages. Section iIO22-8 provides-for "further relief"
which according to every available authority (excepting the
Indiana act which is constitutionally limited) means the execu-
tory relief of the conventional forms of action. Why was this
provision included in the declaratoryjudgments act if the avail-
ability of executory relief would preclude resort to such act?
It cannot be presumed that the legislature would provide for
additional relief to a declaratory action by way of traditional
remedies, if it intended that the existence of circumstances essen-
tial to such traditional remedies would bar recourse to the
declaratory action in any event Did the legislature intend to
say to petitions for declarations, "We will give further relief
to your declaratory action, if necessary, through the conven-
tional forms, but, if the conventional remedies are available you
cannot bring a declaratory action?" Sections i2io2-2 and
12o12-i5 contain the injunction that the act should be "liber-
ally construed and administered." The terms of the act rather
than warranting a narrow construction of its scope specifically
enjoins such an interpretation.
The restriction imposed by the Ohio court is found nowhere
in the terms of the act nor is there any suggestion of an intent
to impose such a limitation. The restriction is one of judicial
construction and is opposed to any legislative intent ascertain-
able in the law. The report of the committee on Uniform State
Laws24 which drafted the uniform act, as enacted in Ohio, mani-
fests an intention that the law should afford a remedy similar
in scope and character to the one available in England. The
remedy there, as has been previously discussed, is an alternative
one. The intention, to enact the English practice of alternative
character, apparent in the original conception of the Uniform
24 See n. 2 1 supra.
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Law, is referable to the Ohio Act which is identical in its terms.
The Ohio court in this instance may have exceeded the scope
of judicial determination outlined by the New York court: "We
may not limit by judicial construction a power which the legis-
lature has conferred without limitation. We may not define
the bounds within which that power may be exercised, except
as we find such bounds implicit in the statute, read in the light
of established public policy."25
Every existing remedy seeks an order of the court which is
to be enforced against a party by the power of the state. Our
procedural machinery has been predicated on the unwillingness
of litigants to recognize legal rights even after they have been
defined by our courts. Such a presumption is not only an affront
to a great group of law-abiding citizens but it is in derogation
of the society in which we live. The presumption, we believe,
is a falsity of fact. Our judicial administration has found suffi-
cient esteem among the people to make the sheriff and his
writs unnecessary to carry out the courts dictates in every case.
It is no exaggerated assumption that a great number of litigants
need not be forced to respect legal rights and duties once they
have been adjudicated. Definition of the law, rather than its
forceful execution, is the object of most judicial controversies.
It is confusion as to rights and duties rather than obdurate dis-
respect of law that gives rise to such controversies. It is well in
keeping with an advancing civilization that our procedural
machinery be so reformed as to afford a remedy of peaceful
character to those parties that need only a definition of law to
settle their disputes. The Declaratory Judgment Act as an
alternative remedy performs this purpose; it recognizes that if
parties desire to obey the law a definition of their rights is suffi-
dent. As an alternative to existing remedies it enables our
judicial administration to assume that the coercive power of the
state need not be brought down on law respecting litigants.
It is indeed time that our judicial machinery should afford
25 See n. 6 supra.
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a more peaceful procedure for the settlement of disputes. Bel-
ligerency, vindictiveness, and threat should be discouraged by
judicial machinery which would provide means to avoid those
elements. By seeking a declaration a party can say to his adver-
sary, "Let us see what the law is!" rather than the threat of,
"I will have you ejected" or "I will have you enjoined." By a
request for a declaration a plaintiff imposes full confidence in
the defendant's respect for the law rather than threatening him
with its force. The court assists parties in settling their own
differences instead of invoking its processes for one of two
belligerent parties. Adjudication is often sufficient. Execution
is not always necessary.
A denial of the alternative character of this remedy would
not only destroy its use as a pacific means of procedure but it
would also curtail its utility for all other purposes. It could
only be used when no other remedy is available. The jurisdic-
tion of equity was seriously confused and curbed by the principle
that it could not be invoked if a legal remedy were available.
Neither the existence nor the adequacy of the legal remedy
was susceptible of a guiding definition and recourse to equity
was always impeded by the doubt arising as to the availability
of the other remedy. The concept of extraordinary jurisdiction
which occasioned this restriction in equity is not present here.
But the declaratory judgment would be subjected to twice this
confusion and restriction if held not to be an alternative rem-
edy, as it would not be available if there was an existing remedy
in either law or equity. Litigants would have to calculate to a
nicety the availability and the adequacy of any existing form of
action. Recourse to the remedy would always be discouraged
by the risk that the court would refuse it because of the avail-
ability of another remedy. Petitioners would always be sub-
jected to this defense before the merits of the controversy could
be heard. A remedy so hedged by doubt and uncertainty offers
nothing to parties who enter our courts for the purpose of find-
ing certainty and definition. Is it a safe assumption that the
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legislature intended to provide a remedy the jurisdiction of
which would be so uncertain and the scope of which would be
so circumscribed? Such an assumption is inherent in the hold-
ing of the Ohio court. In view of the broad purpose of the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgment Act as defined by the authorities
on the subject and by a majority of courts of those states which
have enacted the uniform law, and in view of the English pro-
cedure and practice upon which the uniform act was based, it is
difficult to conclude that such a restriction was ever intended in
the enactment of our law. The act is sufficiently broad in its
terms to admit the addition of a needed procedural remedy. It
is to be hoped that it may yet be given a construction that will
permit a full development of its possibilities.2"
216 "Yet the second group of cases, where the. plaintiff, though capable of
suing for an executory or coercive decree, contents himself with the milder
declaration of rights as adequate to his needs and purposes, though less spec-
tacular, are entitled to equal consideration, for they manifest the important
social function of deciding controversies at their inception-thus avoiding
perhaps irretrievable catastrophe and enable a plaintiff to seek a mild rather
than a drastic remedy, with all its consequences. They assume that the opera-
tive facts, such as a breach, which condition a traditional remedy, have oc-
curred, and yet they recognize the value of an option in prayers for relief.
They recognize that the prayer for relief does not condition or determine the
cause of action and that the plaintiff, in absence of some public reason, should
have a free choice of remedies. They recognize also that the same state of
facts may give rise to a variety of legal interests, justifying a variety of relief,
and that it is not a judicial function to force upon the claimant a drastic
remedy when a mild one will satisfy. Indeed, so revealing of the utility of
flexibility in judicial therapeutics has been the declaratory judgment that
plaintiffs asking for coercive relief alone or for both declaratory and coercive
relief in combination or in the alternative have, in the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion, been granted a declaration only as adequate relief for their needs.
"It would seem clear that in (this) group of cases the declaratory judg-
ment is an alternative and entirely optional remedy, and that there is no justifi-
cation ordinarily for the refusal of a declaratory judgment on the ground that
an executory judgment was obtainable. The few courts in the United States
that have so decided have overlooked or disregarded the purpose of the declara-
tory judgment, the practice in England and elsewhere, and the express terms
of the statute in most American jurisdictions." Borchard's Declaratory Judg-
ments pp. 148-149.
